By contrast, disinformation invites look ing at more systematic disruptions of authoritative information flows due to strategic deceptions that may appear very credible to those consuming them. Solving these prob lems requires more than just fact-checking and setting the record straight and goes to deeper issues of repairing political institutions and democratic values. While the origins of much, and perhaps most, disinformation are obscure, it often passes through the gates of the legacy media, resulting in an ‘amplifier effect’ for stories that would be dismissed as absurd in earlier eras of more effective press gatekeeping. From W Lance Bennett University of Washington, USA Steven Livingston The George Washington University, USA 2018

The above shows a higher-order importance than the UNESCO’s Ireton et. Al 2018 which focused on fact checking as a key journalistic skill

I don’t really like the way the bennet and Livingston focus on the “radical right” for disinformation. This was as a response to the postmodern idea that objective knowledge is impossible, that knowledge is a contruct of power. This was then extended to the intersectionality and identity politics movement, which completely undermined the existence of known facts – such as the existence of a gender binary and many others. This then created a gap for and perhaps a requirement for a response by the conservative (AKA “right”) dubbed or slandered as the “radical right” . it meant that every conservative voice was tarnished as “extreme” or “radical”, though most were actually caused as moderate responses to the “radical left”. The existence of “radical right” views I do not dispute. Im saying that that one followed the other and I’m less included to value benned/Livingston because they seem to focuso the right without balance to the dominant social force in the laste 20 years – the radical left. Such as Kimberly crenshaw and Judith butler and robin diangelo. They seem ot conflate disinformation with the right while really there’s disinformation by state actors (Russia and china in the grey zone as part of hybrid warfare), while there’s disinformation by radical right actors. All of this is to influence the ‘middle’ and slander those who have conservative views (that pre-op self-identifying transgender woman shouldn’t be in a girls changing room for example).

This is from bennet and Livingston “Attacks on the press are not new. For example, Richard Nixon’s vice president Spiro Agnew is remembered for his criminal conviction on charges of tax evasion and for his famous 1970 speech when he referred to the press as ‘nattering nabobs of negativism’ (Sullivan, 2016). Nor are fake news stories particularly new developments. Indeed, activists (primarily on the right) have developed methods of hidden camera stings and creative editing to lure political opponents into media traps (Dorf and Tarrow, 2017). A healthy press system can generally absorb occasional official attacks on the press, and scattered partisan sting operations that make the news. But it is something else entirely when public information systems develop large media networks that routinely spread deception and amplify official attacks on the legacy press. Those who support the radical right in the United States and, to varying degrees in other countries, can now find alterna tive media promoting opposing versions of daily reality. These algorithmically enabled communities of like-minded persons now exist on scales not captured by terms like ‘fil ter bubbles’ (Pariser, 2012). There are of course some radical left networks also spreading disinformation, and engaging with fake news. Like their counterparts on the right, many on the radical left have become wary of centre parties and the corruption of democratic institutions, adding to the legitimacy crisis of modern democracy (Della Porta et al., 2017). However, the more general tendency on the radical left is to use impressive outlays of social media and web platforms to organize episodic economic justice and anti-political corruption mobi lizations such as Occupy Wall Street and the Spanish M-15 Indignados. Beyond these visible but short-lived movements, and a handful of movement-parties such as Podemos in Spain, the left seems to have become more engaged with local projects, often celebrat ing an ethos of direct, deliberative, participatory democracy that does not translate well into party formation or comparable levels of electoral success. (Bennett et al., 2017; Curtis, 2016)”

This is from bennet and Livingston 2018 “All of these developments suggest the need to revise political communication theory and scholarship to problematize dominant assumptions about the coherence and func tionality of communication flows between institutional actors, the media and publics. This shift in thinking about the scope and coherence of public communication entails nothing short of rethinking prevailing assumptions about the unity and inclusiveness of democratic public spheres (Bennett and Pfetsch, in press). Finally, we urge colleagues in the field to consider ways in which normative perspectives may be developed to assess the levels of disinformation and democratic disruption in different societies. Perhaps, political communication can recommend ways of restoring public engagement with political institutions that better represent citizens and meet their information needs.”.

This is from XIA 2019. It is to be referred to az an example of russia’s actions in the “grey zone”. “Enter the case of IRA and ‘Jenna Abrams’ To properly contextualize the self-presentation of Jenna Abrams, it would be helpful to understand the objectives of her creators. While it is impossible to establish with certainty how the operators of the Abrams account understood their objectives, existing evidence suggests that the larger goals of the IRA campaign were to exacerbate division and sow discord among the American public (United States of America vs. Internet Research Agency et al, 2018)– a strategy that fits within a longer history of Soviet and Russian infor mation warfare (Abrams, 2016). The Russian campaign was multifaceted and included strategies such as information hacking, strategic leaking, purchased advertisements, and the management of ‘organic’ social media accounts. The preponderance of the Russian-driven content presented on social media through these techniques involved highlighting racial tensions and deep par tisan divides on issues such as immigration, gun rights, and so on (Jamieson, 2018). Impersonating a young, white, American woman, Jenna Abrams (@Jenn\_Abrams) was the second most-followed English-speaking IRA Twitter account, with more than 70,000 followers by the time of her unmasking in November 2017. Her presence was not limited 1648 Y. XIA ET AL. to Twitter: she also operated accounts on Wordpress, Medium, Telegram, and Gab. An analysis by The Daily Beast revealed that Abrams was featured in articles by more than 30 media outlets, among them a number of mainstream news media like The New York Times and CNN (Collins & Cox, 2017)– clear evidence of her success at impersonating American political opinions. An illustrative example is her April 2016 tweet, provocatively noting”  
  
the following notes are from Grok

**Analysis of the Provided Documents for Your Presentation**

Your presentation on "Strategic Communication and Public Trust: Managing Ethical Boundaries in the Irish Defence Forces in the Era of Social Media and Disinformation" (focusing on Adam's slides 13-19 and 26-31) explores ethical tensions (e.g., transparency vs. secrecy, persuasion vs. propaganda), case studies (e.g., Women of Honour, UNIFIL Tunnels), and strategies for building resilience and leadership in the face of disinformation. The three documents—IRETON\_2018.pdf (UNESCO handbook by Ireton & Posetti), LIVINGSTON\_2018.pdf (Bennett & Livingston article), and XIA\_2019.pdf (Xia et al. article)—offer varying degrees of support, supplementation, or dissent. I'll break this down by document, highlighting relevant ideas, quotes, and how they align with or challenge your content. These are based on the provided snippets, metadata, and full-text summaries from accessible sources (e.g., DOIs and PDFs).

Note: IRETON\_2018 and LIVINGSTON\_2018 are already cited in your presentation (e.g., for definitions and dissenting views on disinformation's impact), so they primarily supplement rather than introduce new material. XIA\_2019 is uncited and provides fresh insights.

**1. IRETON\_2018.pdf: "Journalism, 'Fake News' & Disinformation: Handbook for Journalism Education and Training" (UNESCO, 2018)**

This handbook is an educational resource focused on equipping journalists with tools to combat disinformation. It includes modules on truth in journalism, formats of information disorder, and news industry transformation due to digital platforms. It supports your definitions (e.g., mal-information) and supplements resilience-building strategies, but offers limited dissent.

* **Support/Supplementation**:
  + **Public Trust and Truth in Journalism (Module 1)**: Reinforces your emphasis on "fast, factual candour" (Slide 19/31) by stressing journalism's role in maintaining trust through verification and ethical reporting. It supplements leadership strategies (Slides 29-31) with practical training on building audience trust, e.g., via transparency in sourcing. Key Idea: "Truth, trust and journalism: why it matters" discusses how eroded trust in institutions (like the military) creates openings for disinformation, aligning with your notes on institutional culture (Nagl, 1999; Wilson, 2005). This could supplement Slide 27's resilience-building with journalism education as a "whole of society" partnership (Slide 30).
  + **Information Disorder Formats (Module 2)**: Directly supports your definitions (e.g., disinformation as intentional falsehoods, misinformation as unintentional, mal-information as harmful truths—cited in your slides). Supplements ethical boundaries by classifying "grey zones" (Slide 13) like satire or parody that blur into propaganda. Key Quote: "Disinformation: Information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country" (p. 45)—echoes Bachmann (2023) in your notes, offering a UN-backed framework for DF training.
  + **Social Media Roles and News Transformation (Module 3)**: Supplements your discussion of social media vulnerabilities (Slides 18, 27) by examining how digital platforms amplify disinformation through algorithms and echo chambers. Key Idea: "Digital technology, social platforms and the spread of misinformation and disinformation" highlights resilience through media literacy, which could enhance Slide 28's crisis resilience examples (e.g., Women of Honour). Suggests DF leaders adopt verification toolkits for social media monitoring.
  + Relevance to Your Presentation: High supplementation for resilience (Slides 26-31) via educational modules, supporting "inoculation" training (your notes on USAWC, 2024). Could add a slide on journalism-military partnerships for transparency.
* **Dissenting Voice/Opinion**: Mild dissent on overemphasizing candour (your notes on Clancy's bluntness in Slide 15)—the handbook warns that excessive transparency can expose sources to harm, advocating "ethical boundaries" in disclosure to avoid exploitation (aligning with Bachmann & Paphiti, 2016 in your notes). It prioritizes verification over rapid response, potentially challenging "speed and honesty" as the sole lesson from crises.

Overall: Strong supplementation for definitions and resilience; already partially integrated via citations.

**2. LIVINGSTON\_2018.pdf: "The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the Decline of Democratic Institutions" (Bennett & Livingston, 2018)**

This article (published in European Journal of Communication) argues that disinformation thrives amid institutional legitimacy crises, often overstated relative to deeper systemic declines. It's already cited in your notes (e.g., Slides 16, 31) as a dissenting voice, but the full text supplements with examples and historical context.

* **Support/Supplementation**:
  + **Public Trust and Institutional Decline**: Strongly supports your core theme of declining trust (Slide 13 notes: "credibility is strategic capital") by linking disinformation to eroded confidence in institutions like governments and media. Key Idea: Disinformation exploits "legitimacy problems in many democracies," leading to alternative sources (e.g., nationalist or foreign actors)—mirrors your grey zone discussion (Slide 13) and UNIFIL case (Slide 17, where silence risks guilt by association). Supplements leadership strategies (Slide 29) with critiques of "bureaucratic inertia" (echoing Wilson, 2005).
  + **Social Media Roles and Disinformation Spread**: Supplements Slide 18 ("false stories spread faster") with examples like the Sweden "immigrant crime wave" hoax (involving Fox News, Trump, and Russian actors), showing how social media amplifies hybrid warfare (Bachmann et al., 2023 in your notes). Key Quote: "The spread of disinformation can be traced to growing legitimacy problems in many democracies. Declining citizen confidence in institutions undermines the credibility of official information" (p. 123)—directly ties to your DF context of neutrality and peacekeeping.
  + **Ethical Boundaries, Transparency vs. Secrecy, Persuasion vs. Propaganda**: Supplements Slide 16 by framing propaganda as "democracies' use of persuasion" gone awry, with ethical costs in open societies. Key Idea: Leadership failures (e.g., Colin Powell's UN speech on Iraq) illustrate how secrecy erodes trust, supporting your COS’ Dilemma (Slide 15).
  + Relevance to Your Presentation: Enhances dissenting elements (e.g., "panic about disinformation exaggerates its effects" in your notes) with real-world cases like Brexit and Trump's election, supplementing UNIFIL as a foreign disinformation example. Could add depth to Slide 30's partnerships by discussing "whole of society" responses to institutional decline.
* **Dissenting Voice/Opinion**: Primary dissent: Argues disinformation's impact is "often overstated compared to institutional decline" (p. 124), challenging your emphasis on rapid candour (Slide 31) by suggesting deeper reforms (e.g., addressing bureaucratic inertia) over communication fixes. This could counter your notes on Bachmann (disinfo as destructive as kinetic war), urging focus on DF institutional culture rather than just messaging.

Overall: Reinforces your existing citations as a key dissenting source; supplements with case studies for grey zones and resilience.

**3. XIA\_2019.pdf: "Disinformation, Performed: Self-Presentation of a Russian IRA Account on Twitter" (Xia et al., 2019)**

This article analyzes the "Jenna Abrams" IRA account, a fake conservative American persona that gained 70,000+ followers and media coverage. It's uncited in your presentation and offers fresh supplementation on disinformation tactics in social media, with potential mild dissent.

* **Support/Supplementation**:
  + **Strategic Communication and Self-Presentation**: Strongly supplements grey zones (Slide 13) and persuasion vs. propaganda (Slide 16) by detailing how IRA accounts "perform" authenticity to infiltrate communities. Key Idea: Abrams built trust through "personal authenticity" (e.g., relatable lifestyle tweets) and "cultural competence" (e.g., resonant conservative messages), aligning with your notes on hybrid warfare exploitation. Supporting Quote: "The performance of personal authenticity was central to her persona building as a likeable American woman, whereas the performance of cultural competence enabled her to infiltrate American conservative communities with resonant messages" (abstract). This could enhance Slide 17's UNIFIL hypothetical by showing concrete Russian tactics (e.g., multi-platform presence on Twitter, Gab).
  + **Public Trust and Social Media Roles**: Supplements Slide 18 (false info spread) by showing how social media affordances (e.g., polls, hashtags) build rapport and erode trust. Key Idea: Abrams' success in mainstream media uptake (e.g., NYT, CNN) illustrates how disinformation hijacks hybrid systems, tying to your DF neutrality concerns. Relevance: Offers a case study for resilience (Slide 27), suggesting DF monitor for inauthentic personas.
  + **Ethical Boundaries and Leadership Strategies**: Supplements ethical tensions (Slide 14) by highlighting insincere motives crossing boundaries ("manipulating authorship"). Key Quote: "Her motives were insincere, her goal was to manipulate the audience" (p. 1654)—supports your propaganda creep warning (Lemmon, 2024). For leadership (Slide 29), implies DF leaders counter with genuine engagement (e.g., Abrams' fan polls as a model for positive use).
  + Relevance to Your Presentation: High value as a new Russian IRA example, supplementing UNIFIL (foreign disinfo) and Women of Honour (internal trust crises). Could add a slide on "performance of disinformation" to illustrate social media risks.
* **Dissenting Voice/Opinion**: Mild dissent: Emphasizes disinformation's effectiveness through subtle performance (e.g., building 70,000 followers), potentially challenging Bennett & Livingston's "overstated impact" by showing concrete mechanisms exploiting trust gaps. It underscores social media's vulnerabilities without blaming institutions alone, suggesting your focus on candour may need more on detecting inauthenticity.

**Overall Recommendations**

* **Support/Supplementation**: All three documents bolster your themes, especially social media risks and resilience. XIA\_2019 is the most novel, offering a tangible IRA case to vividify abstract concepts like grey zones.
* **Dissent**: Primarily from LIVINGSTON\_2018 (already used); XIA\_2019 mildly counters by highlighting disinfo's potency; IRETON\_2018 softly on balancing candour with ethics.
* **Integration Tips**: Add XIA\_2019 as a case study in Slides 17-18 for social media examples. Use IRETON\_2018's modules for resilience training recommendations in Slide 27. Cite full texts to strengthen academic rigor (per JCSC criteria). This could boost your score in content depth and analysis. If needed, reference DOIs for full access.

Yes — the **IRETON (2018) UNESCO report** you uploaded *does* add something to your slides, but in a very targeted way.

Here’s how it connects:

**1. Definitions & Frameworks**

Your slides already distinguish **misinformation, disinformation, mal-information**. Ireton & Posetti (2018) is actually the *definitive UNESCO reference* for those definitions. You’ve cited Baptista & Gradim for disinformation and Bachmann for misinformation, but swapping in or adding Ireton here strengthens authority.

👉 Amendment: On your “Definitions” slide, credit **Ireton & Posetti (2018)** as the source of the “information disorder” framework. That anchors your conceptual framing in a widely recognised UN standard.

**2. Whole-of-Society / Media Context**

Your “Whole of Society Partnerships” slide leans on NATO StratCom. Ireton (2018) emphasises the **role of independent media, journalism training, and media literacy** as core to resilience. That fits your identified gap — balancing NATO with Irish media/political culture.

👉 Amendment: Add a point such as:  
*“UNESCO stresses that strong, independent journalism is a frontline defence against disinformation (Ireton & Posetti, 2018). For Ireland, this means partnerships must support media literacy and independence, not state control.”*

**3. Credibility & Trust**

Your slides stress “credibility as capital.” Ireton’s framework explicitly links **trust in media** with resilience against fake news. This lets you reinforce your “credibility” point with a UN/UNESCO authority, and tie it more closely to Irish civilian context (press freedom, sceptical public).

👉 Amendment: On your “Sustaining Credibility” slide, add:  
*“UNESCO highlights that trust in independent journalism underpins societal resilience against disinformation (Ireton & Posetti, 2018).”*

✅ **In short**:

* Use Ireton (2018) to **strengthen your definitions** slide.
* Use it again in **Whole-of-Society Partnerships** to balance NATO with Irish media/political realities.
* Optionally cite it in **Sustaining Credibility** to connect your credibility argument with trust in journalism.

es — both **Xia (2019)** and **Bennett & Livingston (2018)** have material that can *strengthen* your presentation or add **dissenting nuance**. Here’s how:

**📘 Xia (2019) – *Disinformation, performed***

* **What it adds**: Shows that disinformation isn’t just about content, but about *performance* — how fake personas (like “Jenna Abrams”) create **authenticity and cultural resonance**.
* **How to use**:
  + Supports your point that **credibility is capital** — because disinformation actors succeed by *performing authenticity* better than institutions sometimes do.
  + Fits into your **“Information vs Influence”** or **“Persuasion vs Propaganda”** slides: you can contrast *corporate-speak by leaders* with how trolls succeed by sounding authentic, relatable, and “in-group.”
* **Limit/Implication**: Authenticity can be weaponised. For Ireland, DF leaders must sound more like *credible humans* than bureaucratic scripts — or else adversaries will out-perform them.

**📘 Bennett & Livingston (2018) – *The Disinformation Order***

* **What it adds**: Argues that the problem isn’t just disinformation itself but **institutional decline** and the rise of **alternative information systems**.
* **How to use**:
  + Provides a **dissenting voice** to Bachmann/Lemmon. Where they see disinformation as a major new threat, Bennett & Livingston argue its effects are magnified because citizens no longer trust institutions.
  + Fits into your **“Sustaining Credibility”** slide: you already mention “institutional decline may be more damaging than fake news” — this paper is the foundational authority for that claim.
* **Limit/Implication**: For Ireland, this means fixing DF credibility isn’t just about countering trolls — it’s about **institutional integrity** (WoH, Crotty, Lariam).

**✅ How they fit into your slides**

* **Slide 16 (Persuasion vs Propaganda)** → add Xia: disinformation wins when it “performs” authenticity better than institutions.
* **Slide 18 (Information vs Influence)** → cite Xia again: trolls show the *dual force* of authenticity + cultural resonance.
* **Slide 31 (Sustaining Credibility)** → reinforce with Bennett & Livingston: the real vulnerability is *institutional decline* — fake news bites hardest where trust is already weak.

👉 In short:

* **Xia (2019)** sharpens your case that *authenticity* is the battlefield.
* **Bennett & Livingston (2018)** give you the **critical counterview**: disinformation panic is overstated — the deeper issue is institutional credibility.

Do you want me to **draft a short “dissenting voices” slide** that plugs in Bennett & Livingston alongside Wilson/Nagl/Fitzgerald, so you’ve got one neat place where you show awareness of alternative arguments?